Notes on Todd May's "Should we go extinct"

 I just finished reading Todd May's short book "Should we go extinct: a philosophical dilemma for our unbearable times", and thought it would be useful to me, if nobody else (really, this is just for me) to write up a short reflection before I forget everything.

It's the kind of book that one might consider to be "pop philosophy" - in the sense that, there are arguments presented, but they're not particularly rigorous. I'd love to read some of his other work on this.

The question is important, and it's an important enough question to merit this kind of treatment. The more people thinking about this, the better.

 There's a lot of focus on what we might consider environmental philosophy, or at least the kind of philosophy focused on our relationship with the environment. This seems reasonable, but it's pretty narrowly focused, and I would've liked to have seen a broader treatment.

 Given it's length, and how entertaining it is, I'd recommend the book for anyone looking for a philosophical beach read.

Things I took from the book

I think his discussions of utilitarianism and happiness in general was useful. He revisits pretty well trodden discussions about the deficits of utilitarianism generally, about how it's not obvious how we're supposed to trade off the experiences of happiness of animals (which, arguably, are of a "lower" type than those available to humanity) with ours. 

1. I do think, though, that the absolute horrors of factory farming should be enough to shock us out of our moral stupor. This is probably what I was missing from the argument - a discussion of our moral emotions (and not just because it's my interest). We should be disgusted by this.
2. To my mind, it's not really a question (or not only a question) of weighing happiness vs suffering, but rather the question of whether there's kinds of suffering that we inflict that are such that we should be ashamed of our existing. The horrors that we inflict on all animals, our environment, etc. are important.
3. I don't think that May is unaware of this though, I think it's probably a harder argument to mount in some ways. In fact, I think what I'd like to see is something that he'd likely consider as one of the ways in which we shouldn't approach the question. Still, I'd have liked to have seen more made about the question of what kind of animal we are, given we are so happy to exist in a world in which this kind of thing happens. 

 

 I also thought that he could have given a little more attention to human suffering. The kinds of evils we visit on each other, the casual violence and racism, war, indifference, etc. that's so prevalent in humanity. Still, perhaps he doesn't need to deal with this to make his case. But for me, the nature of humanity seems to be the most important thing when it comes to the question of whether or not we should continue to exist. This is related to my point above, of course, and may count as a way we "shouldn't" argue this question, according to May. Still, it's the thing that bothers me.

His discussion about Love is fascinating - different philosophical accounts, and the question of whether love would exist without humans (seems it would, given the evidence). I'd really love to dig into this a little more.

The other thing I'd like to look at is Samuel Scheffler's work on "Death and the Afterlife" - really about the significance of the continuing of humanity past our own lives, and the significance of that. If I recall correctly, Scheffler's argument suggests that the value we find in our own life is somehow contingent (or made more valuable) by the notion that there will be ancestors - that we fall in a continual chain of humanity. Something May doesn't seem to address is the kinds of continuity that might follow us and the significance that has to our lives we live now. If I know that the future will hold a utopia where all humans populate the universe Star Trek style, benevolently exploring the stars etc. etc. I will feel like the value of my own life is bolstered by such a future. But if I extrapolate from what I see now, that's certainly not the future I imagine. The character of our descendants have to matter to us.

Perhaps this last point isn't fair - he kind of does deal with this, just not in the way I would. He speaks of "attitude" of future generations - that is, it seems more justifiable for humans to continue to exist if these descendants have the "right attitude" - that they are stewards to nature, care in the right ways etc.